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Introduction
At the time Woodrow Wilson assumed the presidency of the 
United States, Mexico was in the throws of a revolution which had 
begun in 1911 with the resignation of Porfirio Diaz and the rise 
to power of Francisco Madero. The revolutionary upheaval which 
was but two years in the offing when Wilson came to Washington, 
would take thirty years to run its course. Just weeks before his 
inaugural, General Victoriano Huerta had come to power following 
his treacherous betrayal of Madero. For the greater part of the 
next two years, the de facto government of Victoriano Huerta 
would trouble Wilson's administration. It was the first major 
crisis In international affairs which confronted Wilson.
Lacking experience or training in foreign policy or diplomacy 
Wilson, nevetheless, retained near exclusive control over his 
administration's foreign policy. The policy he came to pursue in 
Mexico was, in large part, an expression of Wilson's own 
character and beliefs. He would attempt through his foreign 
policy to bring peace and stability to Mexico. He would not 
succeed.
The present study is an examination of the origins and 
development of America's foreign policy toward the de facto 
government of Victoriano Puerto in Mexico. Focus centers on the 
the role President Woodrow Wilson played in the formulation and 
implementation of America'a foreign policy in Mexico and the 
impact he had upon it. Zt is argued that the policy which
2emerged was largely shaped by Wilson? but? that it was inadequate 
and inappropriate for the events and forces with which it sought 
to contend. As a consequence of this policy? U.S.-Mexican 
relations were severely damaged, so much so that the German 
government was not necessarily shooting in the dark in 1917 when? 
in the infamous Zimmermann telegram, it proposed a German-Mexican 
alliance directed at the United States.
Chapter I
A Character Sketch of Woodrow Wilson
Dynamic political, economic, and social forces in America and 
abroad establish the parameters in which presidents may act in 
formulating their administrations' foreign policy. Moreover, 
these forces directly influence the course and content of 
America's foreign policy. Yet, each president reserves a 
degree of freedom of action in formulating his administration's 
foreign policy. Wilson exercised the full measure of this 
freedom. This freedom was never greater than in the first months 
of his administration when he was, as yet, unfamiliar with these 
forces and the pressures which th*y could bring to bear. It was 
in this environment that Wilson outlined his Latin American 
foreign policy, and specifically, the course to be taken with 
Mexico. The freedom which he experienced at this time gave him 
free reign to incorporate and impress his values and beliefs into 
America's foreign policy. When one examines his foreign policy 
statements one can see mirrored in them Wilson's own character 
and beliefs. While every president personalises his 
administrations' foreign policy, perhaps, more than most, Wilson 
impressed his moral principles and values on American foreign 
policy, furthermore, Wilson's character affected the manner in 
which his administration's foreign policy was formulated and 
Implemented, in order to understand his foreign policy towards 
Mexico one meet first come to understand Wilson and his 
character.
4Woodrow Wilson cane to the White House with an impressive set
of academic credentials. While his educational background
prepared him to deal with domestic matters, it afforded him
little-to-no training in the field of foreign affairs.
Indeed, Wilson had twice been denied appointment as Assistant
Secretary of State for lack of experience and influential 
2support. His presidential campaign had scarcely dealt with such 
matters, and his inaugural dealt exclusively with domestic
3concerns. This did not trouble Wilson, however, for he did not 
foresee his administration's absorption in matters of foreign 
affairs.
Writing of Wilson's deficiencies in matters of foreign 
policy, Arthur Link considered the most serious to be "his 
failure before 1913 to do any systematic thinking about the 
nature, complexity and difficulties of foreign policy and his 
assumption that the main task of diplomacy was the simple one of 
translating national ideals into a larger program of action."* 
Just a few days before he was to take the oath of office, Wilson 
acknowledged his shortcomings in a prophetic remark to a 
Princeton friend: "It would be the irony of fate if my
administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs."5 Fata
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5would fulfill the prophecy by confronting Wilson with a series 
of crises in international affairs directly involving America.
Wilson's lack of knowledge and experience in matters of 
foreR’i policy and diplomacy did not in and of itself predestine 
his administration'8 foreign policy to an ill fate. Selection of 
and reliance upon an able Secretary of State and experienced 
advisors could have compensated for Wilson’s own deficiencies. 
However, such a course was not to be pursued by Wilson. Indeed, 
consideration of such a course was precluded from the outset by 
traits intrinsic to Wilson's character. These characteristics 
would prove determining factors in the content and formulation of 
Wilson's foreign policy initiatives, as well as in their success 
and failure.
Central to Wilson's character were his religious and moral 
beliefs. Wilson was a Presbyterian by inheritance and 
indoctrination. His religious education taught him that 
Presbyterians were a special people whom God had chosen to know 
His will and carry it out. Wilson believed that God revealed 
himself to men and nations through the Bible. Speaking of the 
Bible, Wilson saids
it reveals every man to himself as a distinct 
moral agent, responsible not to men, not even 
to those men whom he has put over him in 
authority, but responsible through his own 
conscience to his Lord and Maker. . . .
Moreover, the Bible does what is so invalusble 
in human life- it classifies moral values. It 
apprises us that men are not judged according 
to their wits, but according to their 
charact^rST that the last of every man's 
reputation is his truthfulness, his squaring 
his conduct with the standards that he knew to
6be the standards of purity and rectitude.6
Man was to conduct himself in accordance with the dictates of God
7"at the risk of the integrity of his own soul." In so doing, he 
revealed to himself and mankind the righteous moral principles 
inherent in man. Man was to struggle against injustice and 
immorality and extol the moral principles revealed in the Bible; 
at all times squaring his actions with those moral standards.
For Wilson, the same moral values that acted as standards of
o
judgment for man applied to nations. It is this sense of 
morality which Wilson brought to the White House and imparted to 
his administration*
Wilson saw these same moral principles in America. As he
asserted: "The force of America is the force of moral principle.
• • • There is nothing else that she loves, and • . • there is
gnothing else for which she will contend." Having found in 
America an expression of the religious and moral beliefs he 
espoused, Wilson would use them as standards for his 
administration’s foreign policy. The impact of Wilson's morality 
would be most profoundly noted in the emergence of 'missionary 
diplomacy'.
From his religious beliefs Wilson acquired a sense of 
personal destiny and devotion to duty which rested upon moral
6Ray Standard Baker and William E. Dodd eds., The 
Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 6 vols., (New York: Harper a
Brothers Publishers, 19^7-1^7), vol. 2, pp. 297-298. Hereafter 
cited as Public Papers.
'HarleyNotts?, The Origins of the Foreign Policy 
of Woodrow Wilson, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, i$37) , p. 8.
iBaker, Public Papers, vol. 2, p. 299.
*Blum, p. 84.
principles. Wilson’s family had a long history of spiritual 
leadership and guidance which it imparted to him. As a youth 
Wilson dreamed of one day accomplishing great things in the 
service of his fellow man. It was to prove an unrelenting 
driving force in his life. This ambition was not motivated by 
prospects of personal glory as much as it was by a desire to 
serve God and mankind. His religious beliefs armed him with 
great self confidence in the righteousness of his cause. He 
envisioned himself a leader of men, interpreting their desires 
just as he came to know the will of God. ft- was a noble goal. 
However, Wilson appears more to have impressed his moral 
principles and ideals upon the American people than to have 
interpreted their will. His own righteous self confidence 
prohibited him from questioning whether he was actually 
fulfilling his goal.
Wilson’s belief in his own righteous and moral character 
coupled with the vision of his own destiny gave rise to a strong 
egotistic element in his character. It proved one of his 
greatest handicaps as it led him to believe in the superiority 
of his own opinions and views over those of others. Wilson 
provided evidence of the extent of his egotism when he remarked: 
WI am sorry for those who disagree with me, . . , because I know 
that they are wrong.
Wilson never viewed his self confidence as egotism. In fact 
Wilson believed an egotist to be "a man who has got the whole
10
.^Hotter, pp. 8-9.
Arthur S. Link, Wilson, The Hew freedom, 
(Princeton? Princeton University Press, IMI), p. £8.
8perspective of life wrong." The tragic irony is that his
description of an egotist closely resembled his own characters
"He conceives of himself as the center of affairs even as affects
the providence of God. He has not related himself to the great
forces which dominate him with the rest of us, and therefore has
set up a little kingdom all his own in which he reigns with
13unhonored sovereignty.” The fate which Wilson believed awaited 
the egotist- Ma life that leads to all sorts of shipwreck"- 
would, in many ways, prove a prophetic discription of Wilson's 
own life.**
Compounding matters further was the fact that Wilson relied
more upon intuition than reason in coming to conclusions.
Speaking critically of Wilson's mental processes, Secretary of
State Robert Lansing argued:
there is the feeling that intuition rather 
than reason played the chief part in the way 
in which he reached conclusions and judgments.
In fact, arguments, however soundly reasoned, 
did not appeal to him if they were opposed to 
his feeling of what was the right thing to do.
Even established facts were ignored if they 
did not fit in with this intuitive sense, this 
semi-divine power to select the right. . . .
With him it [his judgment] was a matter of 
conviction formed without weighing evidence 
and without going through the process of 
rational deduction. His judgments were always 
right in his own mind, because he knew that 
they were right. How did he know that they 
were right? Why he knew it, and that was the 
best reason in the world•
Other contemporaries have confirmed Lansing's observation.**
-------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
...Baker, Public Papers, vol. 3, pp.430-431.
“ ibid., p.'Ul. 
i?lbid.
“ ibid., pp. 67-68.
1#Ibid., pp. 68-78.
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9This predisposition of Wilson’s would profoundly effect his
selection of and recourse to advisors and counsel, and the
content of his administration*s foreign policy.
When Wilson did seek advice it was usually from men who
agreed with his views or were supportive of his position. In
this way Wilson was assured of perpetuating his own
misperceptions and misconceptions indefinitely. For Wilson, "the
penalty for cramming one’s mind with other men’s thoughts . . .
[was] to have no thoughts of one's own. Only that which enables
one to do his own thinking is of real value." The status of
Wilson's relations with many of his friends and associates was
predicated upon their intellectual submission to his way of
thinking. Only those who were intellectually 'loyal' were taken
into his confidence and allowed to ' advise' him. Speaking of
Wilson’s friendships, Arthur S. Link correctly observed, "he
demanded not forthrightness and a masculine type of give-and-take
in his friendships, but a loyalty that never questioned, always
18understood, ar;3 inevitably yielded to his own will." Link's
observation was equally applicable to Wilson's staff assistants,
advisors, and associates. Ironically, in his Constitutional
Government in the United States Wilson praised President
Washington for his willingness to consult regularly with others
19and use their advice in formulating policy. Regrettably,
I^Baker, Life and Letters, vol. 1, p. 87. 
jj:Llnk, Wilson, The Mew~Treodom. p„ 67.
^Woodrow Wilson, Constitutions! Government in the 
United States, (Columbia: Columbia University Press, '.^08), p.
U T
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Wilson did not possess this trait and was not willing to
cultivate? it. Instead he created an atmosphere which neither
promoted nor permitted a free exchange of ideas, and greatly
effected the content of information flowing to him.
Walter H. Page had long been a friend of Wilson's when he
excepted the ambassadorship to the Court of St. James. Wilson
spoke highly of Page and relied heavily upon him for advice and
his reports on public opinion in Great Britain and Europe.
However, this intimate relationship came to an abrupt end when
20differences arose between the two over American neutrality.
During a visit to the United States Page attempted to impress his
21views on Wilson only to find him completely unreceptive. Page
had lost Wilson's confidence and his status as an advisor.
Wilson could tolerate dissenting opinions from his associates up
to a point. If they persisted, however, and refused to
subordinate their thinking to his, they could no longer remain
one of his trusted advisors. Similar circumstances would cause
Wilson's Secretary of State Bryan to fall into disfavor and later
22submit his resignation. Even worse, Department of State
counsellor John Bassett Moore, an experienced, knowledgeable and
forthright advisor, found himrelf outside Wilson's inner circle
23following continued disagreement over Wilson's Mexican policy.
----------------------------- „ -------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------- --------------
2?Notter, pp. 349-351•
^Charles Willis Thompson, Presidents I've Known 
and Two Near Presidents, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,imwYr'swr*--------
**Sidaey Bell, Righteous Conquest: Woodrow Wilson
and the Evolution of the New Diplomacy, (London: KennikatPress,
inc.; T m i r a i S i m .— -----
^Robert Crunden, Ministers of Reform, The 
Progressives' Achievement In Americantlvlllration, li&§-1920, p.
11
He too felt obliged to submit his resignation in 1914, depriving 
the President of one of his most sagacious advisors.
Lacking experience and training in matters of foieign policy
Wilson could have sought the counsel of Foreign Service officers
in the State Department or the Congressional members of the House
and Senate committees on foreign affairs. As President of the
United States, Wilson had in these individuals a vast wealth of
knowledge and experience from which to draw. It was not his
practice, however, to consult regularly or at great length with
his subordinates or other informed individuals either within or
outside the government. His character precluded him from such a
course. Charles Thompson, a Washington reporter, observed that
"Wilson was willing to receive information provided the
information came from anybody not specifically qualified to give
it. He seemed to shrink instinctively from having anybody tell
24him things who was an authority on the subject.14 Such 
authorities posed an affront to Wilson and his thinking, and were 
therefore not received.
Wilson had reason to ignore the advice of Department of State 
officials. Wilson genuinely distrusted the officers of the 
Foreign Service. Even though a merit system had earlier been 
instituted for the advancement of most State Department 
personnel, Wilson viewed them as Republican holdovers who 
continued to adhere to Republican ideology in the execution of 
their responsibilities.^ As he explained in 1913:
l i f f
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We find that those who have been occupying the 
legations and embassies have been habituated 
to a point of view very different# indeed# 
from the point of view of the present 
administration. They have had material 
interests of individuals in the United States 
very much more in mind than the moral and 
public consideration which it seems to us 
ought to control. They have been so bred in a 
different school that we have found# in 
several instances# that it was difficult for 
them to comprehend our point of view and 
purpose.
Wilson could have bettered the situation had he been able to
attract good men to fill important ambassadorships and
departmental positions. Regrettably# most of the men Wilson
27favored were unwilling to serve. Unable to attract the men he
initially desired# Wilson reverted to the time-honored practice
28of rewarding men for their service to the party. Worse still,
Secretary of State Bryan, an avowed spoilsman, was busy awarding
loyal party men with positions within the State Department and in
29overseas legations. As a result of such actions, many very 
qualified and experienced professionals resigned, or were 
dismissed or demoted, to make way for the incoming political 
appointees. The President was at once deprived of a professional 
body familiar with not only the issues in foreign affairs, but, 
the conduct of diplomacy.
Lacking confidence in the staff of the State Department and 
Foreign Service, and unwilling to request counsel from Congress, 
Wilson turned to his own brand of 'informal diplomacy*. Personal
-------------- sj— ~ —  ----------------- — ----------
Arthur S. Link, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 
28, (Princeton*- Princeton University Press, 10#), p. 2ft.
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..Baker, Life and Let 
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executive agents had proven themselves invaluable to a number of
Wilson's predecessor*s, but none relied on their services to the
extent he did. During his two terms in office Wilson would call
upon agents to embark upon a number of fact finding, good will,
and diplomatic missions to places such as Europe, Russia, Mexico,
and the Philippines. Mexico alone would require the services of 
30eleven men. Wilson wrote of the efficacy of informal 
diplomacy: "I have come to see that the real knowledge of the
relations between countries in matters of public policy is to be 
gained at country houses, in brief, that when we know the men and 
the matters of opinion, we know more than foreign ministers can
31tell us." While there is a great deal of truth in Wilson's 
observation, a great many problems resulted from his recourse to 
informal diplomacy.
Normal operating procedures were frequently upset by the < se 
of personal executive agents, and established lines of 
communication were often disrupted or ignored. The result was
32confusion and chaos. In addition, the men selected as 
executive agents were chosen for their ability to work w i tr> 
Wilson. This translated into their holding similar views , s the 
President. As a result of this selection process, these >n n 
rarely provided the President with objective appta sals of events 
and tended to reinforce his preconceived opinions. Worse till, 
had these men desired to present an unbiased repor t iey were 
unsuited for the task. As a whole these men lacked e .perience
14
and knowledge in matters of foreign policy and diplomacy, not to
mention the fact that many were incapable of communicating in the
native language of the country to which they were sent. As a
result of their inadequacies, these agents were greatly
restricted in their usefulness.
Another reason why Wilson did not rely upon or draw from
others in formulating his administration's foreign policy was his
belief that foreign policy fell within the exclusive domain of
the president's powers. The American people had chosen him as
their leader, and in so doing had invested in him their
sovereignty in matters domestic and foreign* His devotion to
duty and belief in his own destiny would not allow him to
delegate responsibility, especially when he was best equipped to
carry out the trust. Wilson came to recognise in President
Theodore Roosevelt's administration the potential powers of the 
34president. After having successfully marshalled pulic opinion,
Roosevelt had extended and enlarged the powers of the presidency.
Amongst the many important powers Wilson believed the president
possessed, foreign policy was one of the greatest. In his book
Constitutional Government in the United States Wilson wrote:
One of the greatest of the President's powers 
• • . [is] his control, which is very 
absolute, of foreign relations of the Nation.
The initiative in foreign affairs, which the 
President possesses without any restriction 
whatever, is virtually the power to control 
them absolutely. The President cannot 
conclude a treaty with a foreign power without 
.he consent of the Senate, but he may guide
^Arthui u Link, The Higher Realism of Woodrow 
Wil on and other assays, ( ishvilie: Vanderbilt University
' bid., pp. ,46147.
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every step of diplomacy, and to guide 
diplomacy is to determine what treaties must 
be made, if the faith and the prestige of the 
government are to be maintained. He need 
disclose no step of negotiation until it is 
complete, and when in any critical matter it 
is completed the government is virtually 
committed whatever its discrimination,-the 
Senate may feel itself committed also. 5
Clearly Wilson did not see the presidency as subserviant to 
Congress in matters of foreign policy. Just as President 
Theodore Roosevelt had used public opinion to bludgeon Congress 
into submission, so too would Wilson. Public opinion was 
the key. Wilson believed it to be the only legitimate 
means of compelling Congress. Though he observed proper form 
in making periodic reports to members of the House and Senate 
foreign affairs committee, he had little use for Congressional 
advice on his administration's foreign policy. As President of 
the United States, and the ole national spokesman, Wilson would 
direct the course and content of American foreign policy with 
Congress lending its stamp of approval. Such a view of the 
presidency conformed well with his own egotism.
Wilson's character, his ideas, beliefs and moral principles
all left their mark on his administration's foreign policy. They
directly effected the content and formulation of his
administration's foreign policy. Tenets which were central to
his adtainistratlon's foreign policy arose which incorporated
these ideas and beliefs. They would provide the motivation for
much of Wilson's diplomacy in Mexico.
-------------------------------------------- ------ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.^Wilson, pp. 77-78.
„Wilaon, p. 71.
'Link# Wilson, The Mew freedom, p. 28.
Chapter II
Tenets Central To Wilson's Foreign Policy
In his first inaugural address on March 4, 1913, Woodrow 
Wilson spoke of a "change of government." The change he spoke 
of referred to more than the success of the Democratic party over 
the Republican party in both houses of Congress and the 
presidency. Wilson believed the Democratic party had received a 
mandate from the American people "to interpret a change in its 
[the nation's] own plans and point of view." The role of chief 
interpreter of this change naturally fell upon Wilson as leader 
of the Democratic party*
Wilson believed that the American people wished the
government to place greater emphasis on human rights and the
general welfare. In his address he noted that "the great
Government we loved has too often been made use of for private
and selfish purposes."^ Wilson had long admonished the
Republican party for neglecting the general welfare in favor of
American business interests. In an article in Harper's Weekly
entitled "Living Principles of Democracy", Wilson portrayed the
Republican party as having
sought to serve the nation by showing 
confidence in those who are the most 
conspicuous leaders of the country's business 
and of its economic development. . . . Their 
action has shown that their confidence was not 
in the views and desires of the people as a
------------------------------------------- ------------------------ .--------------- — ---------------------- --------- --------- ------------------------------------------------------ ------ -------------------
tBaker, Public Papers, vol. 3, p. 2. 
flbld.
JIbid., pp. 2-3.
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whole, but in the promotion of the interests 
of the country at the hands of those who 
chiefly controlled its resources. It has been 
their first thought tg safeguard property and 
establish enterprise.
While Wilson was not advocating a policy hostile to big business
interests, he did not recognize their right to special
5governmental patronage and priviledge. Speaking to one of his 
advisors about American business interests in Mexico, Wilson 
summed up his views: "I am President of the whole United States
and not merely of a few property holders in the Republic of 
Mexico."** More importantly, he saw the people’s welfare as the 
just focal concern of government.
Economic expansion abroad became increasingly important to 
industrial nations following the turn of the century. The 
securing of foreign markets for surplus goods and capital was 
believed to be of vital importance to these nations if they were 
to prosper. President Taft incorporated this belief into 
American foreign policy in the form of 'dollar diplomacy*.
Dollar diplomacy harmonized American foreign policy with the 
administration's domestic policy supportive of big business 
interests.
Wilson denied President Taft's dollar diplomacy a central 
role in his administration's foreign policy. Mo longer would big 
business interests dictate the course and content of American
4-Ibid., vol. 2, p. 195.
?Ibid., p. 232. 
iHill, p. 19.
'P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Interventions 
The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1919- 1917, 
(Cambridge MA.: MIT Press, , pp. 1-4.
0
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foreign policy to the detriment of the general welfare. Speaking
on behalf of the tdministration, Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan wrote to the American charge d'affairs in China
in September of 1913, regarding the relationship between the
United States government and American enterprise abroad:
This Government expects that American 
enterprise should have opportunity everywhere 
abroad to compete for contractual favors on 
the same footing as any foreign competitors. . . .
This government . . . stands ready, if wrong 
be done toward an American citizen in his 
business relations with a foreign government, 
to use all proper effort toward securing just 
treatment for its citizens. . • •
[But], this Government could in no case be 
expected to involve or imply forcible 
interference in . . . financial or political 
affairs.
Wilson envisioned a purpose for American enterprise abroad 
higher than simple concern for capital gains. In The Origins of 
the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, Harley Notter explains:
"he [Wilson] believed • • . that American material interests 
should be advanced, but only in a manner calculated to carry 
abroad ideals of liberty and democracy, love of mankind, and 
conscience." This was but another expression of Wilson's own 
belief that man should be devoted first and foremost to spiritual 
rather than material matters. These ideas Wilson would 
incorporate into "A Mew Latin-Ametican Policy" which he announced 
on October 27, 1913, before the Southern Commercial Congress.
pBryan to Williams, September 11, 1913, Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, l$ti, 
(Washingcon, D.C.* Government Printing Office, 14iS), pp. 
185-187. Hereafter cited as Poreign Relations.
Notter, p 231.
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Wilson concluded:
it is a very perilous thing to determine the 
foreign policy of a nation in terms of 
material interest. . . • She [the United 
States] must regard it as one of the duties of 
friendship to see that from no quarter are 
material interests made superior to human 
liberty and national opportunity [national 
development].”
While the influence of business interests on American foreign 
policy was relegated in importance, that of morality was elevated 
to an unprecedented level. According to P. Edward Haley, Wilson 
believed ”in the force of morality in international affairs;” 
feeling that America would vindicate moral principles around 
which other nations would flock.11 These moral principles acted 
as the standards upon which men and nations were to be judged. 
These were, of course, the very moral principles embodied in 
Wilson's own character.
If moral principles were to have a new role in international
affairs, then the United States was to be their champion. For
Wilson saw in America and its citizenry the moral character which
he believed was coming to the fore. Speaking before an audience
gathered to celebrate the tercentenial anniversary of
the translation of the Bible into the English language, Wilson
affirmed his faith in the moral righteousness of America:
Nothing makes America great except her 
thoughts, except her ideals, except her 
acceptance of those standards of judgment 
which are written large upon these pages of 
revelation. America has all along claimed the 
distinction of setting this example to the 
civilized world- that men were to think of one 
another, that governments were to be set up
TB--------------- --------------------------‘ Baker, Public Papers, vol. 3, pp. 64-69.
AiIbid., voi.1, pp. 15-16.
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for the service of the people, that men were 
to be judged by these moral standards which 
pay no regard to race, or birth, or 
conditions, but which assess every man 
according to his single and individual value.
A devotion to the service of others and an unwavering
adherence to the principles of liberty, justice, equality, and
discipline and order were the dominant traits of the American 
13people. Implicit in such reasoning was an assertion of 
American moral superiority. Its ultimate expression came in his 
conception of an American 'mission*. Wilson frequently spoke of 
America's mission, but perhaps never in such absolute terms as 
when he addressed the Federal Co ncil of Churches on December 10 
1915:
(America's] object in the world, its only 
reason for existence as a Government was to 
show men the paths of liberty and of mutual 
serviceability, to lift the common man out of 
the paths, out of the sloughs of 
discouragement and even despair; set his feet 
upon firm ground, tell hiir., 'Here is the high 
road upon which you arc as much entitled to 
walk as we are, and, we will see that there is 
a free field and no favor, and that as your 
moral qualities are and your physical powers 
so will your success he. We will not let any 
man make you afraid, an Lwe will not let any 
man do you an injustice.4
The responsibilities such a 'mission' placed upon America were 
beyond its or *ny other nation's capabilities. Yet, Wilson's 
belief in the righteousness of such a course overoad other 
considerations.
In a speech delivered or. October 25, 1913, entitled "Be
l?Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 298-29 
i'Tlbid., vol, 1, pp. 15-16. 
A,Ibid.t vol. 3, pp. 437-438.
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Servants of Mankind", Wilson encouraged fellow Americans "!-.o
15enrich the world." He envisioned for America a tutelary role 
as educator to the politically underdeveloped nations. Under 
American tutelage they would be transformed in the American 
image. 'Dollar diplomacy' had been replaced by 'missionary 
diplomacy’.
In an interview with Samuel G Blythe of the Saturday Evening
Post, on May 23, 1914, Wilson revealed the nature and scope of
this newly assumed responsibility.16 Wilson proclaimed:
We have an object lesson to give to the rest 
of the world; an object lesson that will prove 
to the skeptical outsiders that this Nation 
rises superior to considerations of added 
power and scorns an opportunity for 
territorial aggrandizement; an object lesson 
that will show to the people of this, our own, 
hemisphere, that we are sincerely and 
unselfishly the friends of all of them, and 
particularly the friends of the Mexican 
people, with no other idea than the idea and 
the ideal of helping them compose their 
differences, starting them on the road to 
continued peace and renewed prosperity, and 
leaving them to work out their own destiny, 
but watching them narrowly and insisting that 
they shall take help when help is needeo.
(Italics mine) C
America was to provide more than just a model to other 
nations for contemplation and emulation: she was to assume a 
tutelary role, as well. Convinced of the righteousness of 
American moral superiority, Wilson assumed, on behalf of the 
United States, not only the right to determine which nations were 
polit illy underdeveloped and in need of 'help*, but the right
JJlbid,, p. 57. 
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to impose that 'help' upon them whether they wanted it or not. 
Wilson could not recognize the imperialistic overtones such a 
policy communicated to other nations. Wilson believed that all 
countries must surely see the righteousness of American motives, 
and embrace her 'help1 with open arms.
As early as 1901, Wilson had outlined the course which lie
before the United States in fulfilling its 'mission1. Though he
spoke specifically of the East, the same course, with minor
modifications, was applicable to any underdeveloped nation.
The Bast is to be opened and transformed, 
whether we will or no; the standards of the 
West are to be imposed upon it; nations and 
peoples which have stood still the centuries 
through are to be quickened, and made part of 
the universal world of commerce and of ideas 
which have so steadily been awakening by the 
advance of European power from age to age. It 
is our peculiar duty, as it is also England's, 
to moderate the process in the interest ef 
liberty: to impart to the people thus driven 
out upon the road of change, so far as we have 
opportunity or can make it, our own principles 
of self help; teach them order and 
self-control in the midst of change; impart to 
them, if it be possible by contact and 
sympathy and example, the drill and habit of 
law and obedience which we long ago got out of 
the strenuous process of English history; 
secure for them, when we may, the free 
intercourse and the natural development which 
shall make them at.least equal members of the 
family of nations.
America's strength, Wislon believed, stemmed less from its 
institutions than from its moral character. Therefore, concern 
should not be given to educating these countries in American 
insitiutions. Indeed, he felt their imposition on underdeveloped 
countries would prove a 'curse'. Instead, "we must aid their
18Ibid., vol. I, pp. 412-413
character and elevate their ideals, and then see what these will
19bring forth.*1 America could give them "the spirit of service, 
a government and rule which shall moralize them by being itself 
moral, elevate and steady them by being itself pure and 
steadfast, inducing them into the rudiments of justice and 
freedom.1,20
Upon assuming the presidency, Wilson was confronted with a 
crisis in Mexico, a country which by his definition was 
politically underdeveloped. His attempts to 'educate' Mexico and 
fulfill America's missionary 'responsibilities' would reveal the 
frailties and inadequacies of a foreign policy based on such 
moralistic and tutelary tenets.
These were the tenets which figured prominently in Wilson's 
foreign policy. In large part they were an extension of Wilson's 
own character. They were not absolutes, however, and when 
political, economic, and social pressures came to bear on them 
they often gave way or were perverted. Wilson would come to 
confront these forces, but, in the early months of his 
administration when he undertook to formulate his foreign policy 
towards the de facto government of Victoriano Huerta in Mexico, 
he gave little consideration to them.
21
*?Xbid*, vol. 1, p. 413. 
2iIbid.
Chapter III
Huerta's Rise to Power and the Taft Administration
Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, General Victoriano
Huerta was named commander in chief of the Federal forces.
Madero was reluctant in appointing Huerta* He had reason to
question the General's loyalty.*’ Circumstances provided him few
options, however, and his appointment did hold out the
possibility of reinforcing the the army's loyalty to the 
2government. It was a gamble which was to prove fatal.
General Felix Diaz and General Gernardo Reyes along with 
others revolutionary conspirators had unsuccessfully attempted to 
recruit Huerta to their cause. Huerta had refused them because 
he felt the incentives promised him were insufficient to risk 
involvement. After his appointment, however, he was in a Latter 
position to exact greater concessions from the rebels. So on 
February 10, 1913, he initiated negotiations with the rebels.*
It was during a meeting with General Diaz that it was decided 
Huerta should carry out a 'phony war' against the rehel forces. 
The purpose being to decimate the ranks of the loyal Federal 
troops and prolong the fighting in order; to incite unrest and
^Wilson to Knox, February 10, 1913, Foreign 
Relations, 1911, p. 701.
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destabilize the government.
With Huerta in command of the Federal forces, the 'phony war' 
was begun on Thursday, February 11. Three days of intense 
bombardment of the arsenal in which General Diaz and his men were 
hold up followed. In accordance with their earlier agreement, 
Huerta positioned his cannons in such a way as to inflict no 
serious damage to the rebel forces. The area adjacent to the 
arsenal, however, suffered widespread destruction, and a great 
many innocent people lost their lives. Diaz* position was 
strengthened while Madero's was growing increasingly vulnerable 
to conservative and radical opposition, as well as to protests 
from the resident diplomatic corps. The plan had succeeded.
On February 13, Madero was placed under arrest. His life was 
in grave danger from the very first day of his capture.
Under threat of death, Madero and his Vice-President, Pino 
Suarez, submitted their resignations^ Foreign Minister Lascurain 
assumed the provisional presidency long enough to appoint Huerta 
his successor, and then resigned. In this way Huerta's 
assumption to the presidency maintained the appearance of 
constitutional sanction. The new government had no more use for 
these men, and on February 22, both men were assassinated. The 
provisional government’s official statemen reported that a 
struggle had taken place when a group attacked the automobiles in 
which the two men were being transferred to new quarters in the
gKst*, p 97.
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P net ntiary. The truth was that the men responsible for Madero 
and Suarez' deaths did not come from outside the automobiles, but
prather, had accompanied the prisoners as their guards. Huerta 
was directly implicated in the assassinations, however, the exact 
nature of his involvement remains a mystery.
Throughout the rebellion the American ambassador, Henry Lane 
Wilson, actively supported the cause of the revolutionary forces,
believing that "public opinion, both native and foreign, . . .
9seems to be overwhelmingly in favor of Diaz," To that end,
"Ambassador Wilson's action's aimed at discrediting the Madero
government at home and abroad through threats and protests, at
isolating Madero from his supporters, and finally at forcing him 
10to resign." Such a course of action would require an extension 
of the Ambassador's powers. So it was that on the first day of 
hostilities the Ambassador telegraphed the State Department for 
instructions, suggesting that if he were "clothed with general 
powers in the name of the President" he might be able to "induce 
a cessation of hostilities and the initiation of negotiations 
having for their object definite pacific arrangement."*1 The 
State Department response denied him the freedom of action he
requested. In practice he would excercise these powers, in
13spite of State Department directives*
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In spite of the Department's call for caution and restraint,
Ambassador Wilson met with President Madero to protest the
14continuance of hostilities. As early as February 9, Ambassador
Wilson had found Madero's assurances to protect foreign lives and
15property unsatisfactory. Ambassador Wilson placed the burden
of responsibility for the loss of life and property completely on
Madero's shoulder. He was unwilling to recognize that Diaz
shared equally in the blame. As Jules Davids' observed:
The Ambassador had adopted the attitude that 
Madero, by not surrendering to General Felix 
Diaz was responsible for the bloodshed and 
loss of American life and property. Wilson's 
entire perspective of the situation had become 
warped by his bit|gr, personal animosity to 
President Madero.
On February 13, Ambassador Wilson received word that an
17understanding could be arranged between Diaz and Huerta. On 
the next day, armed with this information, Ambassador Wilson 
called together the diplomatic corps for i conference to decide 
on the course to be taken toward Madero and the revolutionary 
forces. It was decided that a request for the President's 
resignation should be made in order to end the bloodshed and
18destruction and prevent possible international complications. 
Madero refused their 'advice' on grounds that he was Mexico's
**Jules Davids, American Political and Economic 
Penetration of Mexico, 1877-1931"]! (New York: Arno Press, 1976) ,
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legally elected president and would not "recognise the right of
19diplomats to meddle in the internal affairs of Mexico."
Nevertheless, Madero's position had become so unstable that he
later agreed to their request for an armistice.
Around two o'clock on the following day news arrived of the
20President's arrest Later that day, Diaz, Huerta, and Wilson
met for three hours, and, "after enormous difficulty", Wilson
"managed to get them to agree to work in common on an
understanding that Huerta should be the provisional President of
the Republic and that Diaz should name the Cabinet and that
thereafter he should have the support of Huerta for the permanent 
21presidency." Throughout the meeting he was supportive of 
Huerta's candidacy for the presidency, and had recourse to
22threaten General Diaz should he not consent co the agreement.
For Huerta, Ambassador Wilson's actions could only be seen as
representative of American support. Ambassador Wilson himself
believed that he had acted in direct accordance with the
Administration's wishes. This is evidenced by his message to the
State Department congratulating them "upon the happy outcome of
events which have been directly or indirectly the result of its
23instructions."
After Madero and Suarez' arrests, concern for their saftey 
was voiced by both their families as well as State Department
i«ibid*f?Davids, pp. 304-305.
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officials. In response to calls for intercession on the
prisoners* behalf, Ambassador Wilson and the German minister co
Mexico, Rear Admiral Paul von Hitze, visited Huerta to request a
25guarantee of their saftey. Huerta said he was willing and able
to guarantee their saftey and would assume complete
responsibility for their lives. During this meeting it was not
Ambassador Wilson, but Hintze who was insistent on this point and
26exacted Huerta’s assurances. Had Ambassador Wilson demanded
their protection, Huerta would likely have been forced to take
concrete measures to ensure their safety. American support and
recognition was too critical to his government to have risked
offending American sensitivities. However, the Ambassador did
not press the issue and under the circumstances Huerta had no
27reason to want Madero alive as a potential advisary.
Without American support it appears the Huerta-Diaz coup
d*etat would have failed. Throughout the struggle Madero had
maintained undisputred control over the whole of the city, with
28the notable exception of the arsenal. The revolutionaries had
not been joined either in the city or in other parts of the
country by others sympathetic to their cause. Indeed, the only
opposition was that from the arsenal numbering only a few hundred
men. Ambassador Wilson could have brought the struggle to an end
at any time had he given his full support, and that of America,
to Madero. This would have been sufficient to end the revolt and
----------------------------- „ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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secure the very peace he sought. This was not the course he 
pursued, however.
# The Taft administration had come to believe that a 
continuation of Madero's government meant further chaos and 
disunity in Mexico. During his brief presidency the political 
and economic stability of the country had been allowed to erode. 
It was not an environment conducive to American buisness 
interests nor Americans living in Mexico. The conclusion was 
evident to all involved: Madero must go.
In the last weeks of his presidency, Madero’s position was 
greatly undermined by the machinations of the American ambassador 
who appears to have been one of the first to determine that 
Madero should not be allowed to remain in office. To that end 
Ambassador Wilson helped to create and reinforce an atmoshpere of 
instability and disorder. He portrayed Madero's government and 
its actions in an unfavorable light to both his superiors in 
Washington and to the other members of the diplomatic corps.
Once the conspirators had gained American support, it was just a 
matter of time before Madero's government collapsed. Though 
Ambassador Wilson celebrated his success in removing Madero from 
power, he would soon find that he could not so easily gain 
recognition for the newely installed government from the Taft 
administration. Ambassador Wilson should have paid more 
attention to the disposition of Madero's life. For in the wake 
of Madero's death, domestic and foreign sentiment turned on 
Huerta. The blood from his assassination stained not only Huerta 
but the Ambassador as well* It was a stain they could not 
remove* and It contributed to both of their removal from office.
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From the very start, Ambassador Wilson urged the Taft
administration to recognize the de facto government of Victoriano
Huerta. He argued that Huerta could restore political and
economic stability to the country, but, only if he had American
29support and recognition. Secretary Knox responded to the 
Ambassador’s pleas by explaining that the Taft administration 
wished to proceed with caution in determining "their [Huerta's de 
facto governmont) ability and earnest disposition to comply with 
the rules of international law and comity, the obligations of 
treaties, and the general duties to foreigners and foreign 
governments incidental to international intercourse." Knox 
instructed the Ambassador that "assurances from the Provisional 
Government that outstanding questions between the United States 
and Mexico will be dealt with satisfactorily would go far in 
prompting friendly relations between the two countries.
On February 24, the Ambassador wrote to inform the Secretary
that Huerta had agreed to take "immediate action over everything
32else" on the outstanding issues. Huerta's verbal commitment
was insufficient, however, and the Secretary again cautioned
Ambassador Wilson not to extend recogniton to the provisional
government without specific instructions from the State 
33Department.
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Secretary Knox had reason to question the validity of the 
Ambassador's reports and adherence to departmental 
instructions. So when the Ambassador began reporting to the 
Department that public opinion was supportive of Huerta's 
government and that he had restored order, the Secretary was
unwilling to except the Ambassador's 'observations' at face
35value. Furthermore, American consuls throughout Mexico were
submitting reports which contradicted the Ambassador's 
36statements." Indeed, they wrote of growing unrest and chaos.
The Ambassador had also c o m  under attack in the American press
for his role and involvement in the Huerta-Diaz coup d'f tat. In
the last days of the administration, it appears that Secretary
Knox and President Taft increasingly viewed with suspicion the
Ambassado's reports and actions. Solely on the basis of the
Ambassador's advice, Secretay Knox was unwilling to suggest that
America extend recognition to Huerta.
Madero's assassination had been followed by a clamour of
protests in the American press. The New York Times called for
38immediate intervention to protect American lives and property. 
Throughout the United States there were cries for American 
intervention to redress the injustice perpetrated by Huerta.
Taft responded to these pleas in his last presidential statement 
on the Mexican situation:
I have no sympathy, none at all, and the
31..Davids, p. 314.
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charge of cowardice does not frighten me with 
that [proposed course of action] which prompt 
us for purposes of exploitation and gain to 
invade another country and involve ourselves 
in war, the extent to which we could not 
realize, and the sacrifice of thousands of 
lives and millions of treasure.”
Under the prevalent domestic atmosphere any hopes for an early
recognition evaporated.
As a consequence of the Taft adminstration1s decision that
Francisco Madero must go, Victoriano Huerta had come to power.
It was not planned, however, that the new president should have
his predecessor murdered. This did not preclude Huerta's
recognition, however. Taft's actions were always in strict
accordance with the Constitution and established tradition.
Traditionally, American recognition was extended to all de facto
governments once outstanding issues between the two countries
were settled and the new government showed itself capable of
governing. Taft's administration acted in accordance with this
established procedure, and would have extended recognition to
Huerta immediately had he not been so intransigent in the
49Battling of outstanding issues. As his administration drew to 
a close, it appears that Taft was activated to withold 
recognition by a desire to allow the incoming president free 
rMgn in formulating his policy towards Mexico. Ironically, It 
was President Taft and not President Wilson who, in the last 
weeks of his administration, initiated the policy of 'watchful 
waiting*. He would bequeath this policy and the situation in 
Mexico to President Wilson.
f^eline, pp. 133-134.,BDavids, p. 316.
Chapter IV
The Revolutionary Backdrop
In 1876 Porfirio Diaz came to power in Mexico. As dictator
he would rule, with only a brief interruption, to 1911. His
dictatorship ushered in a new era in Mexico’s history.1 Under
his direction political and economic stability was secured. This
required Diaz* exclusive control over the whole of the country,
which in turn meant the near absolute destruction of all local
2and regional leadership. All power was centralized and based in 
Mexico City under the President’s direct control.
Under Porfirian rule Mexico's economy flourished. Diaz 
fostered foreign investment and business interests in Mexico.
The economic advances and prosperity which resulted from this
inflow of foreign capital was enjoyed by members of the upper
3class and a new class of foreign colonists. This prosperity did 
not come without its costs, however. The generous concessions 
granted foreigners allowed them to gain control of Mexico's 
financial and transportation systems as well as its mining and 
manufacturing industries. The preferential treatment granted to 
foreigners provoked in many nationals feelings of resentment.
For them, the foreigners were a constant reminder of their 
country's exploitation. Such feelings ran deep, and were part of
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a growing nationalism which would be expt ud throughout the 
Mexican Revolution. The material benefits v ich accrued to the 
upper class were in theory supposed to 'trickle down' to the 
lower classes. The theory did not work in practice, however,.
All benefits went either to the upper classes and foreign 
colonists or were expropriated to foreign shores. Meanwhile, the 
lower classes faced fixed wages and inflationary prices. Under 
the Porfirian economic system, the rich got richer and the poor 
poorer.
Given the country's skewed income distribution and the 
complete domination of the government by the upper classes, 
unrest was inevitable. It gradually took root in the lower 
classes who desired agrarian reform and better wages, and in the 
middle classes which wished to share not only in the country's 
economic prosperity but in the political process as well. By 
1910 the seeds of revolution were ripe, and an oppressed, 
landless peasantry found in Fransisco Madero their symbolic 
leader.
While the lower classes sought economic and social reform, 
Madero himself fought for political reform. Both the lower and 
emerging middle classes rallied around Madero. Faced with 
mounting opposition Diaz fled in exile in May of 1911. In the 
sixteen months as president which followed, Madero was able to 
introduce a degree of political, economic, and social reform into
ethe country. However, hit efforts towards political and
llbid., pp 14-15
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economic reform were met with opposition from reactionary forces 
which sought to protect their special priviledges by restoring 
the status quo ante* Furthermore, the aroused passions of the 
lower classes proved to beyond Madero1s control; they would 
ultimately engulf him. In the words of Kenneth Grieb, "Madero
had promised everything to everybody and inevitiably found it
£
impossible to fulfill these sweeping pledges.” On February 22, 
1913, Madero became the Revolution's next sacrificial lamb.
In the wake of Madero*s murder, Victoriano Huerta, who had 
through treachery and betrayal rested the mantle of leadership 
from his predessor came to power. In many ways Huerta's 
government was like that of Porfirio Diaz. Conservative in 
orientation, it had the support of the traditional ruling 
classes. Many of the same traite which characterized Diaz's 
government returned, though frequently more intensified. German 
minister Paul von Hintze, an emphatic supporter of Huerta, 
commented: "The government displays a corruptibility and
depravity that exceeds anything known in the past. . . .
7Unfortunately, the army is not free of the corruption." The
oppression experienced during Diaz' dictatorship also returned,
though in Hintze's words it approached "the form of senseless 
n8rage."
After taking office, Huerta gradually abolished the few
political, and social freedoms Madero had managed to implement
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during his brief pre ency. The only important legacy Huerta 
had to contend with was Congress, Under Madero's direction 
Congress had become a real forum for oppositional views. This 
Huerta was not willing to tolerate. When in October a dispute 
with Congress arose over the deputies1 saftey and the location of 
their meeting place, Huerta seized the opportunity to dissolve
QCongress and call for new elections. Not unsurprisingly, the 
elections which were rigged resulted in a pro-Huerta Congress.
Huerta believed that only a strong central government could 
succeed in securing and promoting the peace and prosperity of the 
country. As he explained to Nelson 0*Shaughnessy, the American 
charge: Mexico is "not ready for any government save a
dictatorship."10 His ability to maintain a strong central 
government was dependent on the rupport of the army. For in 
spite of his oppressive measures, from the very start of his rule 
Huerta faced considerable armed opposition.
In the state of Morelos, Emiliano Zapata was in open revolt. 
He refused Huerta's conciliatory offer of the state governorship. 
Zapata believed Huerta to be "opposed to every norm of legality, 
justice, law, and morality", and he affirmed that "the revolution 
will be continued until the fall of the so-called president."11 
When attacked, Zapata's forces frequently proved themselves 
capable of repulsing the Federal troops. When defeated the 
peasants scattered, only to regroup later under Zapata's 
leadership. Zapata's strength came from the local peasantry
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which effectively tied him down and prevented him from taking the
offensive against Huerta. For most of Huerta's rule, Zapata and
his revolutionary forces confined their fighting to the state of
Morelos. Only during the summer of 1914, when Huerta's position
was very unstable, did Zapata take the offensive.
Zapata led a homogeneous group of peasants who sought the
return of th.ir expropriated lands from the hacendados. Unlike
the northern revolutionaries whose demands included political,
economic, and social reform, Zapata's forces were concerned
primarily with agrarian reform. While Zapata never openly
critized the northern revolutionaries he was unwilling to
recognize Venustiano Carranza as the head of the Revolution in
accordance with his plan of Guadalupe. Throughout the struggle
against Huerta, Zapata treated him as an equal amongst the other
13revolutionary leaders. Indeed, by the summer of 1914, it was 
Zapata who was calling for Carranza and all other revolutionary
14leaders to recognize him as the chief leader of the Revolution.
Later, following the split between Carranza and Villa, Zapata
would come to establish closer ties with Francisco Villa,
15believing him to favor agrarian reform.
Two revolutionary leaders, Francisco Villa and Venustiano 
Carranza, dominated the revolutionary forces in the North. In 
addition to these two men., Alvaro Obregon and Pablo Gonzalez 
headed important revolutionary contingents. The revolutionary
i^Katz, pp. 123-125.
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forces of the North were unlike those of the South, The northern 
leaders had a highly mobile population to draw upon.^ Unlike 
Zapata's peasants who were tied to the land, the majority of men 
who filled the northern ranks were seasonal laborers. However, 
people from all walks of life and class were represented in the 
revolutionary forces of the North. This diveristy of composition 
led to a diversity of demands which in turn proved a constant 
sourc > of dissent and disunity amongst them. While southern 
forces lived off the land and were for the most part self 
sufficient, revolutionaries in the North were more dependent on
17economic assistance, which usually came from the United States. 
Intially, Carranza had not been opposed to Huerta. During
the first days of Huerta's rule, Carrania had attempted to
18negotiate with the new president Huerta's assumption of an
intransigent position led Carranza to discontinue negotiations.
When Federal troops entered Saltillo, Carranza determined to
resist Huerta. Shortly thereafter, he formulated his plan of
Guadalupe by which he proclaimed himself Nadero's heir and First
19Chief of the Revolution. He also announced that his efforts 
would be toward restoring constitutionalism to the country. His 
claim to being Madero's defender and the naming of his forces 
Constitutionalists gained him domestic and foreign support.
Early in 1913, Villa consented to Carranza's plan of 
Guadalupe and recognized him as the First Chief of the 
Revolution. Though differences existed between the two leaders,
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their mutual desire to see Huerta removed from office led to
their political and economic cooperation. The cooperation proved
worthwhile. Together the revolutionary armies continually proved
themselves super or to the Federal troops. By mid summer
victories had been registered by the Constitutionalists in the
20cities of Naco, Parral, Matamoros, Zacatecas, and Durango.
Only their restricted access to capital and arms prevented them 
from making further advances on Huerta's position early in 1913.
Most of che arms and munitions bought by the nothern 
revolutionaries came from the United States. Though an 
official embargo prohibited the sale of arms and munitions to 
the Constitutionalists, smuggling was widespread. The American 
border population was overwhelmingly supportive of the 
revolutionaries and willing and able to aid their cause. When on 
February 3, 1914, the arms embargo was lifted the previous 
trickle of arms and munitions became a flood. Better equipped, 
the revolutionaries went on to make significant advances against 
the Federal forces. Early in 1914, Ciudad Porfirio Diaz,
Ojinagai and Ciudad Juarez were taken. While Huerta maintained 
control of the central regions of the country, the 
Constitutionalists clearly controlled the North. By mid March of 
1914, the Constitutionalist were readying themselves for their 
final offensive against the Federal forces. The offensive proved 
successful and led Huerta to resign on July 14, 1914.
As Huerta's position began to crumble dissent amongst the
"Ibid., p. 58.
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various factions grew and undermined their basis of cooperation.
By mid-April of 1914, the differences between the two leaders
increasingly proved beyond reconciliation. P ior to Carranza's
triumphant march into Mexico City on August 20, the two men had
maintained the outward appearance of unity and cooperation. It
proved to be no more than an appearance. On the very day
Carranza was entering the capital, Villa was busily recruiting
men and resources for a fight against the First Chief.24 The
Revolution was not over. It had just begun.
The Revolution which began in 1911 destroyed the country's
political and economic institutions and structures. As historian
Howard Cline once observed: "society lost its moorings in those
years of violence and large scale transformations. In the
wrecking process . . . moral authority lost its sanction, and
with it crashed law and order." Throughout this period of
revolutionary adjustment chaos and disunity prevailed. As Frank
Tannenbaum explains in his book Mexicos The Struggle for Peace
26and Bread, Mexico has historically lacked unity. Division by
language, race, culture, and class has been the rule. It is this
division which figures prominently in the Mexican Revolution from
1911 onwards. Throughout the Revolution rebel groups came
together for the mutual purpose of deposing the current president
only to fall into division and dissent once their objective had
been achieved. Cooperation and unity always proved ephemeral.'
The divisive elements of Mexican society led Tawnenbaum to
— ----------------------------------- — ■— .------------- •— - —  ---------- -—  -----------------------------------
^Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, pp. 128-150. 
,J!lbid., p. 15#.
^Cline, p. 113.
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remarks "For half a century the one political certainty in
Mexico was that any government, regardless of party or avowed
27purpose, would be overthrown." Revolution during this period 
became the accepted instrument of change. Mexico was 
experiencing a political, economic, and social upheaval which 
effectively prevented unity and peace from settling in the 
country for some time.
President Wilson's knowledge of Mexican history was at best 
cursory. While dealing with the Huerta regime Wilson made 
little attempt to familiarize himself with the historical 
antecedents to Huerta's rise to power. Similarly, he never 
examined in any great detail the political and economic systems 
Huerta or his Constitutionalist advisaries sought to institute. 
The political, economic, and social structures in Mexico were 
experiencing dramatic change. Yet, Wilson's understandings of 
these changes and the dynamic forces which brought them about was 
quite limited. In order to formulate an effective foreign policy 
towards Huerta, Wilson should have come to grips with these 
forces. He did not. Instead, he accepted as adequate his 
superficial and fragmented understanding of the events and forces 
in Mexico. His personal ignorance and unwillingness to 
supplement his knowledge prevented him from preparing an 
effective foreign policy appropriate to the circumstances in 
Mexico.
mm mm mm rm mm m
27Ibid., p. 81.
Chapter V
In Search of Recognition
From the very start, the Wilson administration was innundated 
with appeals for recognition of the de facto government of 
Victoriano Huerta. As Early as March 12, Ambassasor Wilson wrote 
to Secretary Bryan informing him that "present indicators point 
to the establishment of peace and order throughout the Republic 
within a fairly reasonable space of time.”1 In the months that 
followed the Ambassador intensified his campaign to convince the 
Secretary and the President that Huerta was the only man who 
could restore political and economic stability to Mexico, and, 
therefore, should be granted American recognition.
Ambassador Wilson's pleas were joined by those from other 
State Department officials, the most notable being Counselor John 
Bassett Moore. In a memorandum to Secretary Bryan dated May 14, 
Moore outlined the reasons why the current administration should 
extend recognition to Huerta's de facto government.
2. The Government of the United States having 
originally set itself up by revolution has 
always acted upon the de facto principle. We 
regard governemnts as existing or as not 
existing. We do not require them to be chosen 
by popular vote. We look simply to the fact of 
the existence of the government and its 
ability and inclination to discharge the 
national obligations. . • .
3. The Government at present existing at the
---------------- -— ------------------------ ------------- .------- -------- — -------------
H. Wilson to Bryan, March 12, 1913, Foreign 
Relations, 1913, p. 776.
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City of Mexico is the only government 
proffessing to be able and willing to 
discharge the international obligations of the 
country. . . .
4. The opposition to the recognition of the 
central authority of Mexico seems to be based 
chiefly upon the circumstances attending the 
killing of Madero two days after he had 
resigned the Presidency. . . .  We cannot 
become the censors of the morals or conduct of 
other nations and make our approval or 
disapproval of their methods the test of our 
recognition of their governments without 
intervening in their affairs.
American business interests were expressing similar concerns 
over the present administration's policy of withholding 
recognition. Early in May, James Speyer, a New York banker, 
warned Wilson that lacking American recognition, no responsible
3banker would be willing to loan money to Huerta's government.
He further informed the President that failure to obtain 
financing for payments on a 10 million dollar loan coming due in 
June would place his government in default and probably lead to 
its collapse. Worse still, in the resulting disorder and chaos 
the United States might be forced to intervene.
Of a similar nature was a memorandum entitled "Suggestions 
bearing on the problems of the present relations of the United 
States and Mexico, growing out of the disturbed political 
conditions of the latter country", which Julius Kruttschnitt, 
chairman of the board of the Southern Pacific Company, 
communicated through Colonel House to the President. Prepared by
^Arthur S. Link, ed., The Papers of Woodrow_Wllson, 
vol. 27, (Princetbnt Princeton University Press, l$6tf-l$86), pp. 
437-438. Hereafter cited as Pipers,
SIbid., pp.404-4lF
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Delbert James Haff, a lawyer who specialized in representing 
American mining and railroad interests, Phelps, Dodge Company, 
the Greene Cananea Copper Company, and the Mexican Petroleum 
Company had all lent their approval to the communication. As Ray 
Stannard Baker wrote, this proposal was representative of 
business' 'Big Interests' regarding the Mexican situation.*
Haff wrote that the absence of American recognition of the de 
facto government had had an encouraging effect on the 
Constitutionalists who viewed the administration's policy of non 
recognition as an expression of its support for their caused 
The continuation of the revolution promised to "utterly ruin the 
country, and destroy a large part of the one thousand million 
dollars of American investment t h e r e . H e  estimated the losses 
to American investments at more than a million dollars a day.7
Haff was not insisting on a return to 'dollar diplomacy'.
Indeed, he agreed with the President's recent statement
repudiating his successor's policy. However, Haff felt it
necessary to make a significant qualification:
I do not understand this declaration (against 
'dollar diplomacy*] to mean; however, that the 
United States Government has no duty and takes 
no interest in the protection of legitimate 
investments already made by Americans in 
foreign countries at the invitation and on the 
promise of protection of the governments 3f 
those countries.0
In his memorandum he also directed the President's attention
eBaker, Life and Letters, vol. 4, p. 246. 
fLirik, Wilson, The tfew Freedom, vol. 2, p. 419. 
Sibid., p. w : .. .......
gBell, p. 68.
Link, Papers, vol. 27, p. 423.
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to the fact that "foreign nations are becoming restive and are 
seeking to undermine the influence of the United States in 
Mexico. . . .  If Mexico is helped out of her trouble by British 
and German influence, American prestige in that country and the
gcommerce of the United States will suffer damage."
Ambassador Wilson had repeatedly argued this point. If the
Wilson administration was unwilling to support the de facto
government in Mexico, then it would seek support from Europe. He
was threating the administration with the supplanting of American
economic and political influence by European i n f l u e n c e . T h a t
the European governments sought to take advantage of the
situation was born out by remarks made by the British minister to
Mexico. In a discussion with Ambassador Wilson, the British
minister stated that "he thought it entirely fair to make use of
the opportunity growing out of the present embarrassed relations
with the United States for the British enterprises in every
d i r e c t i o n . H e  continued, "there is a semiofficial statement
in the press emanating from the President (Huerta] to the effect
that the Government intends in all ways to show a preference to
the nationals of those Governments which have recognized Mexico
12over those which have failed to do so." The Ambassador was 
making it quite clear to his superiors the risks and costs 
involved in continuing to withhold recognition.
?Ibid., p. 424.
“Arthur S. Link, ed. Woodrow Wilson and A 
Revolutionary World, 1913-1921t (Chapel Hillj University of 
North Carolina,Press# 1^ 82), p. 11.
aH. Wilson to Bryan, Forelg Relation, 1913, p.
12Ibid.,
803.
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Because of Mexico’s proximity to the United States, foreign
governments naturally looked to Washington for guidance in
extending recognition to Huerta. However, when it became
apparent that the new administration was content with pursuing
its policy of 'watchful waiting’ the European governments grew
impatient. As early as March 13, Britsh Minister to the United
States James Bryce had informed Secretary Bryan that Great
Britain was leaning toward recognizing Huerta. By March 31,
Byran was informed of impending British recognition which was
made publicly known on April 1. Most other European countries
quickly followed the British example as well as every Latin
American country, with the notable exceptions of Argentina,
15Brazil, and Chile. Tho latter three countries awaited American 
recognition.
The Ambassador responded to British recognition with a direct
appeal to Secretary Bryan:
without being advised of the policy of our 
Government but from considerations relating to 
the peace and goodwill of this continent I 
deem it it my duty to say to the Department 
that upon the high grounds of international 
polity, American interests and procurement of 
peace and order in Mexico, this Government 
should have the earnest moral support and 
assistance of ours, for if it does not succeed 
in sustaining itself absolute chaos will come 
and intervention will be inevitable.
The administration could not be swayed, however. It was not
784-785.
Relations,
Hoavids, p. 318.
*H. Wilson to Bryan, Forelq Relations, 1913, pp. 
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prepared to extend recognition to Huerta's government at the 
present time.
Finally, the American colony which numbered about 40,000
They too believed that only Huerta was capable of restoring order 
and securing their lives and property.
No doubt these appeals and arguments made an impression on 
President Wilson and Secretary Byran. They had threatened loss 
of American political and economic influence in Mexico as well as 
damage to existing American property and investment. Clearly 
Wilson wished to eliminate foreign influence in the hemisphere, 
and certainly in America1s closest neighbor republic to the 
South. Furthermore, the very real possibility of American 
intervention was predicted, something Wilson was not favorably 
disposed to. Yet, the President and his Secretary were not moved 
by these appeals to extend recognition to the de facto 
government. Wilson and Bryan had other considerations beyond 
that of recognition which concerned them Both men had deep 
reservations as to whether recognition was morally justified. 
Besides which, delayed recognition was not without precedent. 
President Hayes had withheld reconition from Diaz' government for 
16 months.1®
Prior to his inauguration, after hearing news of Madero's 
arrest Wilson had remarked to newspaper correspondents that he 
did not believe any harm would befall the deposed President.19
17favored recognition of Huerta and support for his government.
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When news reached him of Madero's murder and Huerta's implication
in the assassination, Wilson was morally appalled and outraged.
Secretary of S*■ "e Bryan shared his President's moral 
20indignation. These feelings did not dissipate with time, and 
had a profound effect upon their policy towards Huerta.
Wilson could not agree with Counselor Moore's argument that
the moral conduct of a government should not be the basis of
American recognition. Quite the contrary, as Wilson explained in
his address at Mobile, Alabama, in October:
Do not think . . .gentlemen, that the 
questions of the day are mere questions of 
policy and diplomacy. The are shot through 
with the principles of life. We dare not turn 
from the principle that morality and not 
expediency is the thing that must guide us and 
that we will never condone iniquity because it 
is most convenient to do so.
Governments, like men, were to be judged according to their 
adherence to universal moral principles, Perhaps Counselor Moore 
was unaware that the President's March 11, "Statement on 
Relations with Latin America" was not mere rhetoric meant for 
domestic and foreign consumption. Wilson sincerely believed 
that:
We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders 
of republican government hold, that just 
government rests always upon the consent of 
the governed, and that there can be no freedom 
without order based upon law and upon the 
public conscience and approval. We shall look 
to make these principles the basis of mutual 
intercourse, respect and helpfulness between 
our sister republics and ourselves. We shall
29Kendrick A. Clements, William Jennings Bryan,
Missionary Isolationist, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee
Press, 1992), o, «...
*Baker, Public Papers, vol. 3, p. 69.
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lend ouc influence to every kind of 
realization of these principles in fact and in 
practice, knowing that disorder, personal 
intrigue and defiance of constitutional rights 
weaken and discredit government and injure 
none so much as the people who are unfortunate 
enough to have their common life and their 
common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We 
can have no sympathy with those who seek to 
seize power of government to advance their own 
personal interests or ambition.
As Wilson saw it a popular1” elected constitutional
government had been overthrown the president killed by a
23treacherous usurper. Huerta had clearly violated the test of 
'constitutional legitimacy' that the President had outlined in 
his March 11, statement. Huerta had come to power through 
"personal intrigue", and for the purpose of furthering his own 
"personal interests or ambition." To have supported Huerta would 
have meant the repudiation of his test of 'constitutional 
legitimacy'. More importantly, for Wilson reccgniton was the 
equivalent of approval. Wilson's morality would not easily 
permit him to condone the murderous treachery of what he once
24called a "government of butchers.” As a scholar of Wilson's 
foreign policy once observed, "he must not act merely as the head 
of the government, but as an individual who must face a personal 
responsibility, for he believed that personal moral 
responsibility was never lost in the duties of public service.
To the established policy of recognizing de facto governments 
that exist and are able to maintain themselves and comply with
their international obligations, Wilson had the stipulation that
— - — — — — — . . . . . . . ------— . . . — . . —  ---------- . . . . .— . . . . _ —
^Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 85.
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they must also meet the test of 'constitutional legitimacy'.
This revised policy gave America the right and moral obligation 
to inquire into a country's internal affairs in order to 
determine whether the new government was in compliance with its 
constitution. It further permitted America to ascertain by what 
means and for what purpose the government had come to power. As 
President of a morally righteous and selfless country whose only 
concern was for that of the Mexican people, Wilson felt justified 
in his policy. What he failed to realize was that to the Mexican 
people as well as the rest of the people of the world, such a 
policy was insulting and viewed as an excuse to interfere in the 
internal affairs of other countries. The Mexican people wished 
to settle their own affairs without the meddling of their 'well 
intentioned' neighbor to the North. In the words of Robert 
Crunden, Wilson and Bryan had cast themselves in the role of 
"Sunday school teachers giving lessons to the immature."
Wilson was very much concerned with the situation of the
Mexican people. As he explained to Samuel G. Blythe in an
interview in April of 19141 "My ideal is an orderly and righteous
government in Mexico; but my passion is for the submerged
eighty-five percent of the people of that Republic, who are now
struggling toward liberty."27 Thus Wilson had reason to take
exception to Ambassador Wilson's claim that "with 80 per cent of
its [Mexico's] population unable to read and write permanent
democratic government cannot be established in Mexico."28
— — — — ~ — — — —
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Wilson believed that the Mexican people were ready for 
29democracy. As Howard Cline explained: "He [Wilson] assumed
that the Mexican nation, though at a less advanced stage, was
basically the same as the Anglo-Saxon ones; . . . their
problems and outlook were parallel to the ones with which he was
familiar through study and experience." Wilson had only a
superficial understanding of the forces at work in Mexico. He
foolishly believed that by holding free elections and
establishing a constitutionally elected government the country's
problems could be overcome. Only later would he come to learn
that more than political reform was required in Mexico.
While those calling for Huerta's recognition portrayed his
position as stable, the administration was also receiving
conflicting information and advice which reported Huerta's
position to be increasingly unstable. Consular reports from
Hermosilio, Nogales, Mazatlan, Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua,
Saltillio, Monterrey, and Matamoros informed the Department of
growing unrest and disorder in the outlying provinces of the 
31country. Reports also came from consulates supportive of the
32Constitutionalists, which showed their strength growing.
The strongest proponent of recognition was Ambassador Wilson. 
He was the embodiment of 'dollar diplomacy’. Ernest Gruening 
described him as a "spearhead" of American business interests in 
Mexico. As an advocate of 'dollar diplomacy' he was suspect in
York* Appleton-Century-Crofts, 19
87.p. 24.Its Heritage,
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the minds of Wilson and Bcyan. Further undermining his position 
were numerous consular reports which directly contradicted the 
Ambassador's appraisal of the situation in Mexico. Beyond 
questioning the validity of the Ambassador's reports, they also 
had reason to question his ethics. In a dispatch dated February 
26, to the American Consul in Hormosillo, the Ambassador 
revealed another side of his character. Unable to gain 
recognition from his superiors, the Ambassador pursued the 
extraordinary course of instructing the consulate to exert its
efforts toward bringing about the general submission of the local
35government and people to the de facto government. Bryan and 
Wilson were both aware of this dispatch, and it undoubtedly 
strengthened their suspicions of the Ambassador's actions.
If the President was suspicious of the Ambassador's 
motives, he was equall juspicious of those of the 'Big 
Interest'. Businessmen were concerned, first and foremost, with 
the stability of their investments and not necessaritly with the 
welfare of the Mexican people.
Lacking confidence in the Ambassador and State Department 
officials, and bewildered by the mass of conflictory reports and 
advice, Wilson and Bryan decided that they needed reliable 
information which they could trust. It was decided that they 
should send a special agent who could gather the information they 
so desperately needed.
31
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Chapter VI
Personal Diplomacy
William Hale was chosen by Wilson to be his first personal 
agent to Mexico. He was to provide the President with an 
'unbiased' appraisal of events in Mexico. The only 
qualifications Wilson and Bryan appear to have established in 
regards to the position was that who ever was chosen should be 
loyal to the adminstratlon. Hale had provided ample evidence of 
his loyalty to the administration, and Wilson, in particular.^
He had to his credit travelled with Secretary Knox on a tour of 
the Carribbean and Central America. However, he did not speak 
the language, and his knowledge of Mexican affairs was limited.
He also shared with his superiors a sense of Anglo-Saxon 
superiority. The parallels between Hale and Wilsons' characters 
are remarkable, or not so remarkable when one considers Wilson's 
predisposition to deal only with like minded individuals. Hale 
would not report to Wilson or Bryan anything that they did not 
already believe.
Ostensibly Hale's mission had two objectives} to investigate 
the actions of Ambassador Wilson, in particular, to determine
his role in the Huerta-Dlaz coup} and to apprise the stability 
and legality of Huerta's government as well as its ability to 
maintain;’peaoi^ - ;.'
<m*
In his report to Wilson dated Juno 18, Hale stated: "it is
hardly a matter of conjecture-it is a conclusion to which all 
facts point- that without the countenance of the American 
Ambassador given to Huerta's proposal to betray the President,
Athe revolt would have failed." The report effectively sealed 
the Ambassador's fate. After having read the report the 
President wrote Bryan: "I should like . . .  to discuss with you
very seriously the necessity of recalling Henry bane Wilson in 
one way or another, perhaps merely "for consultation* until we 
can have a talk with the man himself." His recall was 
forthcoming and on August 4, his resignation was accepted.
Wilson and Bryan had accepted the accuaracy of Hale's report 
without qualifications. They had no reason to doubt Hale's 
observations as they confirmed their own suspicions.
The Ambassador's position had been declining for sane time 
before Hale's arrival. On Hay 8, Huerta had informed the 
Ambassador that in response to America's unfriendly policy of 
withholding recognition towards his government' he felt 
justified in confining future relations with the Embassy to 
simple routine matters. In July the Ambassador had complained 
to the Department of the loss of dignity and respect the Embassy 
had experinoed as a result of Hale's presence. The situation had 
been made increasingly untolerable by rising resentment against 
the United States, a fact attested to by Hale. '. v. j
Xnreportlngon Huerta's rise to power, Hale assured the
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President that "the betrayal of the President by his generals was 
mercenary treachery and was not in the slightest degree a 
response to sentiments of a nation, or even of the city."^ Hale, 
speaking of Huerta's position, was convinced that his control
0
over the country was slipping. He estimated that Huerta
gmaintained control over no more than one third of the country.
He had also received evidence which showed that Huerta's
financial position was desparate.^ Hale was most disturbed by
the plight of Americans in Mexico who faced rising anti-American
sentiment. According to Hale these feelings stemmed, in part,
from the fact that the Mexican people believed that the
Ambassador's involvement in the coup had been sanctioned by 
11Washington. This strengthened the President's belief that a 
major obstacle hindering Artierican-Mexican friendly relations was 
a misunderstanding of American intentions.
Hale concluded that the Uni led States should not extend 
recognition to Huerta and that to do so would be an "abandonment 
of all principles by which social order is maintained in a 
civilised country He continued, "European powers . . . 
perhaps connive at the overthrowing [of} lawful authority by 
murder, but surely the United States, especially if it would 
wield any moral influence in Latin America, can afford anything 
sooner than to give its countenance to savage contempt for
7--- — -- — — -—iCrunden, p. 438.
IHill, p. 39.
lljnkr vol.
rrtbid., p, 7.tilbid., p. ”
28, p. 3 9 .
57
constitutional authority."
In point of fact, Huerta's position was not as desperate as 
Hale portrayed it. Huerta still maintained control of key
13strategic military points, and the major population centers.
Hale's prophecy of impending doom was premature. His dispathches
arrived in Washington at just the time Wilson and Bryan were
being confronted by Counselor Moore and the 'Big Interests’. The
reports bolstered the President's resolve not to extend
recognition. With the advent of Hale's reports the President
permantely shelved any plan for conditional recognition.
Following Ambassador Wilson's recall, Wilson decided to send
another special envoy to Mexico. John Lind, former Govenor of
Minnesota, was chosen for the mission. Like his predecessor
Hale, Lind was wholly unqualified for the position. Lind had not
even travelled in Central America and was even more ignorant of
Mexican affairs.*'4 Like Hale, however, he was a man that both
Bryan and Wilson could trust without reservation. He would not
present the Administration with any revelations during his stay
in Mexico. Rather, he would lend support to the President's own
misconceptions and misperceptions.
Lind's instructions were to consult with Huerta and to
communicate to dm that the United States endeavors to "counsel
15Mexico for her own good" Lind was told to impress upon Huerta 
the need for progress toward the establishment of a government 
Which would have the consent of the people and which could
Hum, p,:Crunden
I*
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restore order to the country. Specifically, the President
outlined four objectives which if undertaken would go far to
restoring peace and prosperity for Mexico; (1) an immediate
cessation of hostilities throughout the country; (2) guarentees
for an early and free election in which all parties would be
represented; (3) Huerta's assurance that he v uld not be a
candidate in the election; and (4) agreement by all parties that
17they would abide by the results. Once again Wilson had cast 
himself in the role of 'tutor'. The United States knew what was 
best for Mexico, and therefore all that the President had to do 
was communicate those sentiments to the Mexican people and they 
would gladly accede to his leadership. Wilson would later blame 
the failure of his initiative on Mexican misunderstanding of 
American intentions. Wilson was unwilling to accept that the 
fault lay elsewhere. Wilson had placed Lind in an impossible
16
situation, with no hope of success.
Not surprisingly, Lind's proposal was summarily rejected with 
an explanation that the proposal was a direct intrusion on 
Mexican internal affairs. Having failed to gain Huerta's 
accpatence, Wilson brought the matter before Congress and the 
American people. On August 27, Wilson addressed a joint 
session of Congress to explain the course his adminstration
had pursued and the situation in Mexico;
We have waited many months, months full of peril and anxiety, for conditions there to improve, and they have net larproved. , . . it was our duty at least to volunteer our good
George M. Stephenson, J?hn Lift (Minneapolis; University of MinnSsota dress, FTP
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offices-to offer to assist, if we might, in 
effecting some arrangement which would bring 
relief and peace and set up a universally 
acknowledged political authority there.
His mission having failed, Lind was instructed to go to Vera
Cruz to assume the role of an observer, and to be available for
19negotiations. From Vera Cruz Lind would continue to report to 
the President on events in Mexico. However, following Huerta's 
dissolution of Congress in October, his dispatches took on 
greater importance. Lind was to become an adamant supporter of 
military intervention. His sentiments would have a considerable 
effect on Wilson.
I
Chapter VII
The Final Act
In light of Huerta's dissolution of Congress in mid-October,
his arrest of many of its deputies, and his formation of a
military dictatorship, Wilson and Bryan determined that Huerta
would not willingly step down, and that therefore the mantle of
leadership would have to be rested from him. On November 24,
Secretary Bryan dispatched to all American embassies a circular
entitled "Our Purposes in Mexico" which outlined the
administration's new policy:
The present policy of the Government of the United States is to isolate General Huerta entirely) to cut him off from foreign sympathy and aid, and from domestic credit, whether moral or material, end so to force him out,
It (the administration] hopes and believes that isolation will accomplish this end, and shall await the results without irritation or impatience. If General Huerta does not retire by force of circumstances, it will become the duty of the United States to use less peaceful means to put him out.
The administration would adhere to this policy, without 
exception, until Huerta's flight from the country in July, 1914. 
As a direct consequence of this policy the administration would 
come to look tc the Constitutionalists to hurry Huerta's 
military defeat., in the weak* which followed Wilson ond Byran 
sat, out to eliminate any and all diplomatic and finedal support
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£or the Huecta government.
The military advancement of the Constitutionalist forces was 
renewed, and following a brief respite in mid-December showed no 
signs of abatement in the future. On February 3, Wilson further 
strengthened their position by lifting the arms embargo placed on 
shipments to the Constitutionalist forces. Prior to the 
embargo's suspension, Wilson had, nevertheless, conspired to 
allow arms shipments destined for the Constitutionalists to 'slip
e
through' customs. Also encouraging was news that in the weeks 
following the lifting of the embargo, small isolated pockets of 
unrest arose throughout the country, many in areas which had 
hitherto remained peaceful. Yet, in spite of their military 
victories and the suspension of the arms embargo, in the early 
months of 1914 the Constitutionalist forces appeared unable to 
guarantee an early victory.
Huerta's diplomatic and financial situation was no better
off. Under growing Amerioan pressure, foreign governments and 
banks which had earlier supported Huerta were seen on the 
retreat. Wilson's efforts had successfully stoped European 
bankers from implementing a plan in April to refinsnce Huerta's 
outstanding loans, leaving him in desperate straits. Yet, in 
the face of these overwhelming obstacles Huerta managed to
sustain his government.
On January 2, 1914, the Hew York Times editorial reviewed the
Q
situation in Mexico. The editorial concluded that conditions 
were distinctly unfavorable for the de facto government, but not 
before it recognized Huerta's remarkable staying power. The 
historian Friedrich Katz attributed Huerta's resilency in the 
face of overwhelming opposition to his domestic base of support. 
Throughout his struggle against the Constitutionalists, Huerta 
had received the support of the traditonal ruling class who saw 
their property and special privileges threatened by the 
revolutionaries. The Constitutionalists were either unable or 
unwilling to guarantee the maintenance of their 'special 
relationship' with the country's governmental and economic 
institutions. Confronted vith the prospects of a bleak future 
under revolutionary rule, the old ruling class placed their 
resources, which were considerable, at Huerta's disposal.1,0 In 
March 1914, they were able to provide the government with a 
substantial domestic loan which greatly aided Huerta.11, With it 
Huerta was able to stabilise the currenay and better equip his 
troops. He even went so far as to make an alliance with the 
Church and the Catholic party. Throughout the struggle, this 
ruling class remained loyal to Huerta.
Huerta also recelvad considerable support from the British 
Minister to Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden. Though publicly Carden 
maintained a low profile in order to appease American
sensitivities, privately he worked tireously on Huerta's 
12behalf. Carden had long been one of Huerta's closest and 
trusted advisors. Throughout the early months of 1914, Carden 
actively sought to influence his own country's policy toward 
Huerta by bringing British and French pressure to bear on the 
Foreign Office. His efforts met with only limited success, 
however, and early in March he was recalled for consultations.
Wilson grew increasingly impatient with the situation in
Mexico. In spite of military, political, and economic pressures
Huerta continued to maintain himself in power. While his
position showed clear signs of deterioration, Huerta appeared
commited to remain in office until forceably removed. All of his
efforts towards defeating Huerta had thus far failed of their
objective. Worse still, Wilson's special agent in Mexico, John 
' *
Lind, continued to report throughout the early months of 1914,
that Huerta's position was far from desperate. His January
26 dispatch to Secretary Bryan is representative of the
sentiments he conveyed to the Administration: "If given time he
will extracate himself from this present embarrassment
sufficiently at least to prolong his rule indefinitely."1^
Thus far Wilson had restricted his actions to bringing 
diplomatic and economic pressures to bear on Huerta. In keeping 
with his November 24 policy statement, Wilson had endeavored to 
bring about Huerta's removal by '’force of circumstances".
However, faced with a seemingly intractable Huerta, and a distant
Constitutionalist military victory, Wilson had recourse to 
consider military intervention. Lind's reports appear to have 
been Instrumental in precipitating the shift in Wilson's tactics.
For months Lind insisted that only American military 
intervention could bring about Huerta's Immediate removal from 
office. In his March 8 dispatch to Secretary Bryan, he wrote 
what amounted to an ultimatum: "If there is no decided change by
the fifteenth I believe he [Huerta] should be eliminated within 
forty-eight hours after that date. It can be done and our 
preparations at this end are so complete that I believe it can be 
accomplished without military loss of an American.
Besides Lind's call to arms, demands for American 
intervention could be heard coming from all parts of the country, 
and, more Importantly, from Congress. 5 International support 
was forthcoming as well for an Aststican expedition into Mexico to 
reestablish order and protect foreign nationals. In mid-March 
Bryan received news that Germany, in response jto injustices 
oommited against its nationals in Mexico, would support American 
intervention.16
By April Wilson appears to have resigned himself to a policy 
of a show of force against Huerta. It was not too long before an 
incident arose which provided him with the pretext he needed to 
■end troops into Mexico. On April 9, an officer and seven crew 
membfrs from the American cruioer Dolphin, which was anchored in
rjibii.:3d*vijs, p. 371.
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the Mexican harbor of Tampico, went ashore for supplies. Upon 
landing, they were arrested by Colonel Ramon Hinojosa on the 
grounds that the port was under martial law and only authorized 
personnel were allowed ashore. When the commanding general heard 
of the arrests, he had the men freed immediately with his 
personal apologies.
The American Admiral, Henry T. Mayo, outraged over the 
incident, demanded a formal apology and a guarantee that the 
officer responsible for the incident be arrested. Finally 
the Admiral required that Mexico honor the American flag with a 
twenty-one-gun salute.
The commanding general complied with the Admiral's first two 
demands, but was unable to comply with the last. Such an action 
required President Huerta's approval. The matter was deferred to 
him and ha replied that the Mexican government was not disposed 
to meet the Admiral's request.
A fevered exchange of diplomatic notes between Washington and
18Mexico City followed. Huerta made known his willingness to
17
accede to the salute provided the United States would reciprocate 
in kind. Failing agreement on this proposal, Huerta suggested 
that the whole matter be brought before the Hague. Bryan 
sumtnarily rejected the prbpsal. Both parties had reason to wish 
the situation to escalate to the point of open hostilities. The 
possibility of compromise was precluded form the outset.
Robert I. Quirk.
4 j  brief historical account ..... iekstt fa lx * ' •  bosk.
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Huerta was determined not to accede to Washington’s demands. 
As the American charge in Mexico explained to Bryan: MI would
see only one reason for refusal of our demand in view of the fact 
that General Huerta had every opportunity to save face, namely 
that the cause of the Federal Government was lost and that 
foreign intervention was the only fair expectation that could
i asave Mexico from anarchy.” Huerta lent credibility to the 
charge's observation when, upon hearing of the approach of the 
American fleet, he commented, "it is the best thing that could 
happen to us."20
Huerta's position had gradually deteriorated, and though he 
could continue to resist the Constitutionalists forces, his 
position was increasingly unstable. It was just a matter of time 
before the Constitutionalists captured Mexico City. Fo». Huerta 
then, the incident at Tampico held out a last hope for his 
government. Huerta was keenly aware of the possible advantages 
which might accrue to him and his government as a consequence of 
American intervention. The Mexican people were highly sensitive 
to any affront to their national honor, especially if it should 
come from their neighbor to the North. Had Huerta capitulated to 
Washington's demands he would have humiliated himself and 
strengthened the appeal of the Constitutionalists. However, if 
he opposed American demands he was likely to gain domestic 
support. Perhaps even the Constitutionallets, faced with the 
prospect of American intervention, would consider a temporary
Inn Ba I I a m  . 1 B1 A . n XII *7l l 1
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settlement of their differences. It was a calculated gamble; but 
one that he was willing to take given the bleak prospects for his 
government.
On the day the marines landed it appeared Huerta had gambled
correctly. El Imparclal'a headline read "The soil of the patria
21is defiled by foreign invasion! We may die, but let us kill i 
In a similar vane was La Patria1s bold banner which called for 
"Venegeance! Vengeneance! Vengeance!* In the days which 
followed there was an outpouring of support for the government 
and thousands of volunteers turned out to join the Federal 
forces' fight against American aggression. However, the rest 
of Huerta's hopes never materialized. The Constitutionalist 
forces continued their advance, and with the United States in 
possession of the customs house in Vera Cruz Huerta found his 
revenues dwindling. Huerta would not be able to hold out long.
On April 20, 1914, Wilson had gone before a joint session of 
Congress to request their approval that he "use the armed forces 
of the United States in such ways and to such an extent as may be 
necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the 
fullest recognition of tue rights and dignity of the United 
States." Previously he had met with ranking members of the 
foreign relations oommittees of Congress to explain his position. 
It is noteworthy that he did not call these men to the White 
House for their advice or counsel, but merely to inform them of 
his administration's proposed course of action. He had no need
21SiQuirk, p. 194.
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for their advice. He was determined that Huerta must go, and 
that only American intervention could precipitate his early 
removal from office.
At this meeting Wilson made it clear that he was not seeking
intervention for the purpose of protecting American lives and
property. Senator Lodge vehemently opposed him on these
grounds. Lodge insisited that a matter of this importance
could not be based on a personal vendetta, but should rest on
some substantial issue, such as the protection of American lives
and property. Wilson responded that the Americans in Mexico must
25take their chances or leave. Lodge later came to realize that
Wilson's actions were not motivated by a desire to uphold
American honor as much as they were to punish Huerta for refusing
26to submit to Wilson's will and abide by his moral principles.
His address to Congress reflected this: "If armed conflict
should unhappily come as a result of his attitude of personal 
resentment towards this government, we should be fighting only
General Huerta and those who adhere to him and give him their
27suppert." With single minded determination Wilson resolved to
remove Huerta from office. American forces were to remain in
2fiMexico until Huerta resigned or was eliminated. Lind had led 
Wilson to believe that the Mexicans would not resist and that 
Huerta would resign in the face of overwhelming opposition.
24
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Lind's advice was soon proven wrong as American blood was shed on 
Mexican soil.
Originally plans called for American forces to make a naval
demonstration of Tampico on April 21. However, news arrived on
the evening of the 20th that a German steamer, the Ypiranga, with
a substantial shipment of arms destined for Huerta, was headed to
Vera Cruz. Wilson met with his Secretary of Navy Josephus
Daniels that evening and together It was decided that Admiral
29Mayo should be instructed to "take Vera Cruz at once". Both 
men had been concerned that if Huerta received the arms not only 
would his position be strenghtened, but there was the possibility 
that th*se guns could later be used against American troops.
It is ironic that Wilson had gone before Congress to request the 
use of American forces to redress an insult done to the United 
States at Tampico, but that American troops were to land in Vera 
Crus to stop an arms shipment from reaching Huerta's troops. The 
Tampico incident had simply provided Wilson with the excuse he
needed to intervene in Mexico and bring about Huerta's removal. 
The twenty-one gun salute would :tever be given, but then that was 
of little Importance to Wilson.
Plans had been worked out months earlier for an 
invasion of Vera Cruz and these were now Implemented. 
American marines landed on April 21 and fighting broke out 
shortly thereafter. General Maas, in charge of the Federal
m m -
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troops had been instructed to withdraw his men from the city; 
however, against orders many of the men chose to stay and
ended with the retreat of Federal forces, 126 Mexicans and 19 
Americans were killed.
Wilson's response to the news of American losses was one of
shock and horror. As Lodge observedt Mit was only too obvious
that the President had made no- preparation in his own mind for
the most probable event. All he seemed desirous of doing, the
fighting having occurred, was to get out of the trouble in any
way possible without continuing the war which he himself had 
33begun." It was a tragic but accurate appraisal of Wilson's 
lack of consideration of the consequences of his actions. Wilson 
had relied completely on Lind's advice and had not consulted with 
any of his advisors. 4
Wilson had not taken into account that the Constitutionalists 
might resent American intervention. Upon hearing of the American 
invasion of Vera Crus, Carranza wrote to Bryan to inform him that
the occupation of Mexican territory was not looked upon with
«
favor by the Constitutionalists and that the United States should 
consider suspending hostilities and removing American troops.
On April 24, 1914, Bryan responded by writing to one of the 
administration's special agents to request that he impress upon 
Carranza the need for him to maht a public address to the effect
32fight. In the ensuing struggle which lasted for 12 hours and
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that he will maintain a neutral policy towards the United 
States. The adminstration had not figured on opposition from 
the Constitutionalists. Just as Wilson was shocked by the loss 
of American lives, so to now was he shocked by the stance taken 
by the Constitutionalists. He had only given consideration to 
Huerta's removal and little else.
In the days that followed Wilson looked for a way to 
extracate himself from the situation. On April 25, the A. B. C. 
powers (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) offered to mediate a 
peaceful settlement. The adminstration welcomed their offer to 
extend their good offices. The adminstration would continue to 
press for Huerta's removal at this conference, however, Huerta's 
position continued to deteriorate and his end was at hand. While 
the conference was still meeting Huerta resigned. Unable to gain 
recognition, and faced with the advancing Constitutionalists 
forces and no finances, Huerta was unable to maintain his 
position any longer.
C h apter VIII
Conclusion
Woodrow Wilson entered office in March 1913, intent on 
supplanting President Taft's 'dollar diplomacy' with a new 
foreign policy based on morality, which for Wilson was the 
criterion upon which men and nations were judged. From the very 
first, Ambassador Wilson had strong reservations regarding this 
proposed new foreign policy and its application in Mexico. He 
wrote*
the policy transmitted into effect meant simply that no government established in Mexico by revolution would be recognised by the American government, if, according to to our estimate, the revolution was unjustified.We thus constituted ourselves the judges of the laws and the facts, and the dictum amounted to a subversion of the sovereignty of Mexico and a threat against all Latin American governments established by revolution.
The Ambassador's observations penetrate to the heart of Wilson's
foreign policy and reveal it* inherent weaknesses and
inadequacies. Wilson himself wan unable to make much an
examination, as Hobart Quirk has so suceintly put its "he saw
whit he wanted to se* in Mexico, believed what he wanted to
believe, and in all of this was so certain of his own rectitude
that no argument could have swayad him,"2 Rather than seeking
:$tte;'j!^lof::.i^ the 8tata Department or ;
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members of the foreign relations committees in Congress, Wilson 
chose to surround himself with men who were like minded or 
willing to subordinate their thinking to his own. There was no 
chance of eleviating his misperceptions and misconceptions.
The morality which was to serve as a basis of judgement was 
of course Wilson's own. As a consequence, his own moral values 
greatly dictated the course and content of his administration's 
foreign polcy. Following his implication in Madero's 
murder, Huerta was seen by Wilson as morally tainted. It was 
his moral indignation which prevented him from extending 
recognition to Huerta, and thereby breaking with established 
American tradition. It was this same morality which reacted 
to Huerta's dissolution of Congress. Huerta was 'convicted* of 
.immoralty and, Wilson, acting as judge, jury, and executioner, 
carried out the sentence! Huerta was to be removed from power.
To that end Wilson devoted all his efforts.
In dealing with the Constitutionalist#; another aspect of his 
character came to the fore to exert influence on his 
administration's foreign policy. Wilson's belief in an American 
'mission' and the universal application of constitutional 
government led him to 'instruct' the Constitutionalist in the 
'constitutional processes', only to find that they were wholly 
uninterested in the President's advice. Bvery^ attempt by the 
President to instruct the Constitutionalists in what was best for 
them wee rebuked* the Constltuionalists wanted from America its ■ 
financial ■ and diplomatic support and nothing more.: for them it . 
'Was a marriage of convenience. For Wilson it was to be a 
paternalistic relationship. Throughout the struggle# the
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Constitutionalists tefused to play their prescribed role.
On July 14, 1914, General Victoriano Huerta resigned and 
President Wilson's foreign policy received its moral 
vindication. Wilson had taken it upon himself to avenge, on 
behalf of the Mexican people, the wrong perpetrated against them 
by Huerta, namely, his usurpation of the reins of government. To 
that end, he brought about Huerta's fall from power. Behind, 
Huerta left a political vacuum into which entered the 
revolutionary factions. For the next three years they would 
struggle for control of the government and engage their country 
in a bloody civil war. This was Wilson's legacy to the Mexican 
people. He had not brought peace to Mexico nor had established 
there a constitutional government. All he had done was remove 
one man from office. The Mexican people would not thank him for 
the "great service' he had done them.
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